Using a cross-country sample of mergers and acquisitions, we examine the role of cultural, institutional, geographic and managerial factors on post-merger default risk. Our results are consistent with the asymmetric hypothesis that managers take advantage of the overvaluation and volatility of their firm stock prices. We also find that geographic distance and industrial diversification play significant roles in affecting post-merger default risk. We find limited evidence indicating the relevance of institutional quality and culture on default risk.
The impact of cross-border mergers on the acquiring firms' default risk however, has not been comprehensively examined. Due to different characteristics and determinants of cross border mergers from those of domestic merger, the findings on domestic mergers may not be applicable to international mergers. In this paper, we extend Furfine and Rosen (2011) by observing the effects of cross-border mergers on a firm's default risk. We find that, in contrast to domestic mergers, cross-border mergers reduce default risk. Furthermore, we observe that the determinants are mostly different from those in domestic mergers. We find evidence consistent with overvaluation of US firms may lead managers to make risk increasing mergers (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) . We also find that geographic distance between the two countries and industrial diversification affects default risk. National culture has negative but limited relations with default risk. However, consistent with Furfine and Rosen (2011) , we find that idiosyncratic risk is positively related to default risk. Finally, we find that mergers financed with shares are negatively related to default risk, but these relations are not statistically significant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our data and methodology. In section 3, we report the results of our empirical study. Our conclusions are offered in the final section.
Methodology and Data

Methodology
According to Merton (1974) bond pricing model, the market value of a firm's assets follows a Brownian motion:
where V is the firm's asset value,  is the expected continuously compounded return on V, v is the volatility of firm value and dW is a standard Wiener process. The market value of equity, E, is:
where F is the face value of the firm's debt, r is the risk free rate and N is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, d1 is given by:
where T is one year, and d2 is
The volatility of the firm and its equity:
The distance to default is calculated as:
and the implied probability of default is:
Using the naïve version of the Merton (1974) DD model, Bharath and Shumway (2008) report that their distance to default model is superior in hazard models and in out of sample forecasts than the existing models. Thus, we follow Bharath and Shumway (2008) in measuring probability of default risk 1 . We measure F as total current liabilities plus one half of long term debt (Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Vassalou and Xing, 2004) . E is the market capital of the firm's equity. The volatility of each firm's debt is estimated as:
where D is 0.05 + 0.25E and E is the annualized percent standard deviation of returns, estimated from thirteen months to one month prior to the merger announcement. Bharath and Shumway 1 See Bharath and Shumway (2008) for detailed explanation of their model.
(2008) use the firm's stock return over the previous year (rit-1) as the proxy for the expected return on the firm's assets (). Thus, the distance to default is estimated as:
and that the probability of default is:
We use independent variables that are reported to have significant effects on default risk in mergers and as determinants in cross-border mergers. Furfine and Rosen (2011) suggest that idiosyncratic risk, valuation errors proxied by past stock performance and market to book ratio, firm size and type of payment have significant impact on default risk in domestic mergers. They find that idiosyncratic risk increases default risk in domestic mergers. Following Furfine and Rosen (2011) we measure idiosyncratic risk (VOL) as the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer's stock return estimated over the six month period ending one month prior to the merger announcement. Inconsistent with the overvaluation hypothesis, Furfine and Rosen find that acquirers with poor past stock performance tend to make risk enhancing domestic mergers. Following their methodology, our proxies for valuation errors are the buy and hold return of an acquirer's stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the same period (RUNM) and Tobin's q. Market size (MKTVAL) is calculated as the natural logarithm of market capitalization and we use a dummy for mergers financed at least with stocks (SHARES). In addition, we also use a dummy if the acquirer's industry is the same as the target firm's industry (RELATED). Erel et al. (2012) examine the determinants of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. They find that geography, the quality of accounting disclosure, and bilateral trade increase the likelihood of mergers between two countries. They also indicate that cultural differences 2 play insignificant role in cross border mergers which is in stark odds with a recent study (Ahern et al., forthcoming) . Ahern et al. (forthcoming) examine the role of national cultural values on the pattern of crossborder merger activity and the gains they create. Using a comprehensive sample of 20,893 crossborder mergers from 52 different countries over 1991-2008, they find that culture has a significant and economically important effect on the volume of cross-border mergers. After controlling for country-level fixed effects and a range of country-pair variables such as shared legal origin, language, religion, geographic distance they find a strong negative relationship between cultural distance and the volume of cross-border merger activity between two countries. Particularly, the greater is the cross-country difference between the values of trust, hierarchy, and individualism, the smaller is the cross-border merger volume. Likewise, less cultural distance leads to higher combined announcement returns in cross-border mergers. Overall, the work of Ahern et al.
(forthcoming) is consistent with the view that cultural differences impose costly frictions between firms leading to fewer mergers. We control for country-level corporate governance mechanisms, such as the revised antidirector index (ANTIDIR), legal origin (ORIGIN), ownership concentration (OWN), stock market capitalization to GDP (STOCKMKTDEV), law enforcement index (ENFORCE), and accounting standards, such as the time to collect bounced checks (CHECK), prospectus disclosure index (DISC) and periodic filing index (DISCFIL), from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez De Silanes and Shleifer (2008) . We also include the distance between the capital cities of a country pair (GEO).
We use the uncertainty avoidance score (UAI) from Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 2001 as our proxy for natural cultural value. Uncertainty avoidance is one of the facets of natural cultural attributes constructed by Hofstede. Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance score has been used in finance by several scholarly works (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010 and Anderson et al., 2011) in their studies on the determinants of the home bias. These studies show that institutional investors from high 2 They have different measures of culture variables than Ahern et al. uncertainty avoidance countries invest less in foreign equities, which may be supported by the belief that investors may perceive foreign assets to be more risky and hence do not invest in them. Venaik and Brewer (2010) posit that Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance score principally measures the stress component of dealing with uncertain situations. Hofstede (2001) states that 'uncertainty avoiding cultures shun ambiguous situations. People in such cultures look for structure in their organizations, institutions and relationships, which makes events clearly interpretable and predictable'. He constructed the uncertainty avoidance score using three specific survey questions. These are:
1. How often do you feel nervous or tense (at work)? (1. Always to 5. Never).
2. How long do you think you will continue working for this company (or organization)? (1. Two year to 5. Until retirement).
3. Company rules should not be broken -even when the employee thinks it is in the company's best interest. (1. Strongly agree to 5. Strongly disagree).
These questions basically capture three features of uncertainty avoidance which are rule orientation, employment stability and stress. Responses from these questions are combined into one single measure of uncertainty avoidance.
Our industry and year fixed effect regression model is the following:
DMU is the change in distance to default probability calculate following Bharath and Shumway
RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer's stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the same period.
VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer's stock return.
Q is Tobin's q.
LEV is leverage ratio.
SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock.
LNGEO is the natural logarithm of the distance between the acquirer's country and target's country.
LNMKTVAL is the natural logarithm of the market value of the acquiring firm at the end of the month prior to merger announcement.
RELATED is a dummy variable if the target's industry is the same as the acquirer's industry.
DUAI is the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index which is a Hofstede's culture variable, of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country.
DDANTIDIR is a dummy variable if the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country.
DDORIGIN is a dummy variable if the difference between the code for country origin of the acquirer's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country.
DDCHECK is a dummy variable if the difference between the time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country.
DDSTOCKMKTDEV is a dummy variable if the difference between stock market development index of the acquirer's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country.
DDDISC is a dummy variable if the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country.
DDDISCFIL is a dummy variable if the difference between disclosure in periodic filling index of the acquirer's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country.
DDENFORCE is a dummy variable if the difference between public enforcement index of the acquirer's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country.
Data
We collect cross-border mergers data from Zephyr database. Following Furfine and Rosen 
Empirical Results
We provide descriptive statistics of our sample in Table 1 . We find that default risk decreases after cross-border mergers. This result is inconsistent with Furfine and Rosen (2011) but consistent with Leland (2007) . Also, most mergers are related mergers and are cash transactions. The median geographic distance between headquarters of US acquirers and targets is approximately 3,800 miles. Targets countries typically have higher uncertainty avoidance scores antidirector index values than US. Targets countries are generally from similar legal origin as the US. Typically, it takes longer to collect bounced checks in target countries than acquirer countries. In general, the acquiring country (US) has a better developed stock market and has higher disclosure indices than target countries.
In table 2, we report the correlation between key variables used in the study. Most correlation values, except for country-level governance variables, are small and do not have a potential for multicollinearity. The strong correlations among country-level governance variables preclude us from using these variables simultaneously in our multiple regressions.
We regress the change in default risk measured by DMU, the change in distance to default probability, on a number of independent variables capturing firm specific factors, culture, geographic distance and institutional quality. The results for the total sample are provided in Table 3 , while subsample results are reported in Table 3 . The results from Table 3 
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the impact of cross-border acquisitions on post-merger default risk. Our major finding is that managerial factors and geographic distance do play significant roles in affecting post-merger default risk. In contrast to the findings of Furfine and Rosen (2011) DMU is the change in distance to default probability. RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer's stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer's stock return. GEO is the distance between the acquirer's country and target's country. MKTVAL is the market value of the acquiring firm in the merger announcement year. Q is Tobin's q ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. LEV is leverage ratio. RELATED is a dummy variable if the target's industry is the same as the acquirer's industry. UAI is the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DANTIDIR is the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DORIGIN is the difference between the code for country origin of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DCHECK is the difference between the time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DSTOCKMKTDEV is the difference between stock market development index of the acquirer's and that of the target's country. DDISC is the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DDISCFIL is the difference between disclosure in periodic filling index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DENFORCE is the difference between public enforcement index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DMU is the change in distance to default probability. RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer's stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer's stock return. GEO is the distance between the acquirer's country and target's country. MKTVAL is the market value of the acquiring firm in the merger announcement year. Q is Tobin's q ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. LEV is leverage ratio. RELATED is a dummy variable if the target's industry is the same as the acquirer's industry. UAI is the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DANTIDIR is the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DORIGIN is the difference between the code for country origin of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DCHECK is the difference between the time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DSTOCKMKTDEV is the difference between stock market development index of the acquirer's and that of the target's country. DDISC is the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DDISCFIL is the difference between disclosure in periodic filling index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DENFORCE is the difference between public enforcement index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. The dependent variable is DMU, defined as the change in distance to default probability. RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer's stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer's stock return. Q is Tobin's q ratio. LEV is leverage ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. LNGEO is the natural logarithm of the distance between the acquirer's country and target's country. LNMKTVAL is the natural logarithm of the market value of the acquiring firm in the merger announcement year. RELATED is a dummy variable if the target's industry is the same as the acquirer's industry. DUAI is a dummy variable of one if the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country, else zero. DDANTIDIR is a dummy variable of one if the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country, else zero. DORIGIN is the difference between the code for country origin of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DDCHECK is a dummy variable of one if the difference between the time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country, else zero. DDSTOCKMKTDEV is a dummy variable of one if the difference between stock market development index of the acquirer's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country, else zero. DDISC is the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DDISCFIL is the difference between disclosure in periodic filling index of the acquirer's country and that of the target's country. DDENFORCE is a dummy variable of one if the difference between public enforcement index of the acquirer's country is the same or greater than that of the target's country, else zero.
*, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
